The Robert Lansing Institute (RLI) reports that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—long recognized for promoting Russian interests within the EU—has escalated his efforts to help Moscow circumvent Western sanctions. A strategic triangle is now emerging between Budapest, Astana, and Tashkent. While this alliance is officially focused on trade and investment, in practice, it creates legal loopholes that benefit Russian businesses, likely under the Kremlin’s watchful eye.
Trade volumes within this framework have surged, supported by the creation of joint investment funds, special economic zones, and plans for industrial parks, logistics centers, and energy cooperation. Hungary has positioned itself as a critical transit hub between Asia and Europe, even signing a memorandum on the Trans-Caspian Corridor with Kazakhstan’s KTZ Express, Hungary’s L.A.C. Holding, and China’s Xi’an International Port.
On the surface, this appears to be standard economic diplomacy. But when viewed through the lens of Orbán’s geopolitical agenda, the narrative shifts. He is strengthening an eastern pivot as a counterweight to EU influence. His ties with Moscow, Beijing, and Central Asia now extend beyond diplomacy, entering a realm that challenges the boundaries of legality and alliance. Hungary’s economic overtures in the East risk provoking retaliatory sanctions from the West.
In essence, Orbán is trading EU unity for Kremlin favor—repeatedly blocking critical EU decisions in exchange for Russian financial incentives. These moves reinforce his domestic control and funnel wealth into loyalist business circles. The result? Budapest and Moscow increasingly resemble a shadowy enterprise with opaque financial flows measured in billions of euros.
Within this context, Hungary’s partnership with Central Asian nations falls into a legal grey zone. Although Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have condemned Russia’s invasion at the UN, they have refused to impose sanctions. Much like Orbán, they balance precariously between Western pressure and Russian alignment—a convergence of mutual interests. Trade in restricted Western goods with Russia has skyrocketed. For instance, Kazakhstan’s imports of computers have increased sevenfold since 2022, far beyond domestic demand. Microchip exports to Russia soared 7,300%, rising from $245,000 in 2021 to $18 million in 2022.
Here’s the mechanism: intermediary companies purchase Western-made electronics—often from Hungary or Germany—declare them for domestic use in Kazakhstan, then re-export them to Russia as local goods. This method also facilitates the trafficking of dual-use items with military applications. Because Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union, goods move freely across borders once inside the bloc—eliminating customs barriers to Russia.
Special economic zones further obscure the trail by allowing for rebranding of goods before shipment. Hungarian expertise and technologies transferred to Central Asian partners may ultimately end up in Russian hands. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have begun restricting access to detailed customs data, complicating external monitoring and investigative efforts.
Given Orbán’s consistent alignment with the Kremlin, his involvement is unsurprising. Hungarian companies and OTP Bank serve as intermediaries, enabling Russian capital to exploit banking routes through Uzbekistan, circumventing EU financial restrictions. At the same time, Hungarian oil firm MOL continues importing Russian oil through loopholes in the sanctions regime.
What’s really happening is the systematic erosion of EU sanctions enforcement—both politically and economically—led by a member state. Hungary is now actively helping Moscow maintain its global financial lifelines via Central Asia.
Orbán is playing with fire. His actions deepen divisions within the European Union and signal to authoritarian regimes that sanctions can be subverted with the right network of allies. What’s forming is an EU-based hub where Kremlin money meets Chinese investment—an alarming development for European unity and security.
The winners? Moscow and Orbán. The loser? Hungary—now increasingly seen as a “Russian intelligence outpost” within the EU. The response to this challenge must be decisive, democratic, and immediate. 24brussels.online
